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Abstract 
Chinese banking system plays increasingly more important role in the word financial system and 
has attracted a lot of attention during recent years. The purpose of this paper is to study and 
analyze the relationship between government ownership and major Chinese banks’ performance. 
Our paper studies the sample data collected during the period between 2000 and 2011, and 
regression analysis is conducted for the purpose of examining how the government ownership 
change would impact the bank performance. As indicated by previous literature about bank 
performance, bank performance is often affected by bank size, capital ratio and net interest 
margin (NIM). Our results show that decreased government ownership can improve major 
Chinese banks’ performance. 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Government ownership, bank performance, major Chinese banks 
 
 
	  
	  
iii	  
	  
 
 
Table of Contents 
APPROVAL……………………………………………………………………………………………….i 
ABSTRAT………………………………………………………………………………….….………….ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………….…..……….iii 
1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………….........1                                                                                                                                   
2. REVIEW OF CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM REFORM ……………………………….…3                                                     
2.1 Banking system reform prior to 1992 …………………………………………………………….3                                                                                             
2.2 Banking system reform from 1993 to 1997……………………………………………………….4                                                                                      
2.3 Banking system reform after 1997……………………………………………………….………. 5                                                                                                  
2.4 The continuity of reform in banking system………………………………………………………6                                                                                   
3. LITERATURE 
REVIEW……………………………………………………………………...7                                                                                                         
4. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND 
VARIABLES.……………………………………………11                                                                   
4.1 Data……………………………………………………………………………………………….11                                                                                                                                                 
4.2 Methodology and Variables………………………………………………………………………14                                                                                                              
4.2.1 Performance Measures (Dependent Variables)…………………………………………..14                                                                   
4.2.2 Independent Variables (Control 
Variables)………………………………………………15                                                                        
4.2.3 Ownership structure variables (Ownership indicators)…………………………………. 16                                                    
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS……………………………………………………………………..17                                                                                                                    
6. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………27                                                                                                                        
APPLEDIX……………………………………………………………………………………………….30                                                                                                                                                  
REFERENCE……………………………………………………………………………………………..33                                                                                                                                              
 
	  
	  
1	  
	  
1. Introduction 
         As China’s economy continues to expand and its market continues to grow, the country is 
playing increasingly important role in the world economy. Chinese banking sector plays an 
important role in the country’s financial system, and the country’s banking system is huge in size 
and is under continuous transformation. One of the remarkable changes under transformation is 
the ownership change in major Chinese banks, as the percentage of government ownership in 
those banks has gone down and outside investors including foreign investors are allowed to 
invest in many major Chinese banks. In our paper, we conduct empirical analysis using 
regressions of bank performance measures on bank ownership changes, to investigate the 
relationship between government ownership change and bank performance. 
          In the past many studies have examined banking and performance related topics on banks 
in Europe and North America, but there have been few such studies on Chinese banks’ 
performance. As Chinese banking system becomes more important on the international stage, 
many researchers have started to study China’s banking system. We review related studies about 
Chinese bank performance and show that most of these studies did not study the connection 
between government ownership and Chinese bank performance. Although there are several 
papers that have studied how the government ownership would impact performance of major 
Chinese banks, they use data mainly from the period before the year of 2005. As we know major 
Chinese state-owned banks began to initiate public offering since 2005 while majority of joint-
stock banks and city level banks were under reorganization after 2005 as well, the result is both 
ownership and performance have changed dramatically for these banks, so it is worth to have 
detailed study about bank performance during longer time periods. Our study intends to fill the 
time gap and make the study as representative as possible. 
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           We use similar methodology as used by Berger et al. (2005) and selected similar variables 
to analyze data collected for major Chinese banks from 2000 to 2011. Our study focuses on the 
question: does decrease of government ownership of major Chinese banks make these banks 
have better performance?  We classify major Chinese banks into five categories, state-owned 
banks, joint-stock banks, city banks, policy banks and foreign banks. Regression analysis is 
conducted for each type of banks for related performance measures, and then regression results 
are evaluated to find relationship between dependent variables (performance variables) and 
independent variables. Performance variables consist of impaired loans/gross loans (NPLs), 
ROA, and ROE three variables, which are three measurements generally used to evaluate bank 
performance. 
            Our empirical results suggest that major banks in China, especially big five state-owned 
banks tend to perform better when the government ownership on these banks decreases and when 
foreign or private ownership for these banks is introduced, although the degree of correlation 
between government ownership change and bank performance varies among different types of 
banks. Our data also shows that in general bank size and net interest margin are positively 
correlated with major Chinese banks’ performance.  Overall our research findings are consistent 
with results from majority of related literature about the relationship between government 
ownership and banks. 
            The organization of this paper is presented as follows. Section 2 gives the general 
background of Chinese banking system reform since 1970s. Section 3 is related literature review 
about bank performance. Section 4 describes the data and model we used to analyze the 
relationship between ownership change and performance of major Chinese banks.  Section 5 
shows the empirical results about our study, and in section 6 we draw the conclusion of the paper. 
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2. Review of Chinese banking system reform  
            China started to reform its banking system in the late 1970s. The main goal of the reform 
is to establish a competitive and efficient banking system. As the banking system was largely 
owned by the government and was separated from the world’s economic system, it took many 
steps for the reform to form a competitive banking system that contains various categories of 
institutions. 
            China’s banking system used to be a Soviet-style mono-bank model before 1978. 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) worked as the central bank and all other banks in the country 
were under the same administrative hierarchy. After 1978, the Communist Party of China 
decided to gradually reform Chinese financial system and establish a “socialist market economy”. 
As banking system plays a crucial role in a country’s financial system, the reform in banking 
system became the most important and urgent demand for China.  
2.1 Banking system reform prior to 1992 
             Chinese banking system reform can be divided into three stages. The first stage is from 
1978 and continued to 1992. During this period, four state-owned banks were separated from the 
People’s Bank of China. There was no competition among the four state-owned banks since each 
of the four banks had its own area to serve. These four state-owned banks are the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the People’s Construction Bank of China 
(PCBC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). These four state-owned 
banks undertook the commercial bank business of the PBC. In particular, the ABC took the role 
in agricultural financing, the BOC took part in foreign trade, the PCBC took over the mission in 
construction, and the ICBC played role in financing business activities of state-owned business. 
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In this way, the PBC worked as a central bank and carried out monetary and financial policy, and 
the mono-banking system has changed into a banking system consists of one central bank and 
four state-owned banks. 
2.2 Banking system reform from 1993 to 1997 
          The second stage of reform in Chinese banking system began in 1993 and continued till 
1997. This stage of reform was focused on deregulation and aimed to create a more competitive 
banking system. With the issue of the Resolution on Financial System Reform in 1993, Chinese 
banking system added three policy banks. They are China Development Bank, the Export and 
Import Bank of China, and the Agricultural Development Bank of China. The functions of the 
three policy banks are to promote the development of infrastructure, to stimulate country’s 
export and to ensure food productions. The Central Bank Law and Commercial Bank Law were 
issued in 1995, standing to promote a more sound payment and settlement system that can be 
established all over the country. The Big Fours were allowed to expand their business scope and 
to compete with each other. During this period a number of new bank types emerged, including 
city-level commercial banks, domestic joint-equity banks, Chinese-foreign joint-equity banks, 
privately owned banks and foreign banks. The state-owned banks are still the largest banks in 
China. Although city-level commercial banks and joint-equity banks are smaller individually 
compared to the Big Fours, they have grown fast and have a larger number of branches in the 
countryside and rural area. Among the city banks, the first city-level commercial bank, Shenzhen 
City Commercial Bank, was established in 1995. There were more than one hundred city 
commercial banks since 2005, and the camp of city-level commercial banks is still growing 
nowadays. China Minsheng Bank was founded in 1996 and is the first and only privately-owned 
bank in China. Foreign banks have been allowed to enter Chinese bank market since 1979. From 
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1979 to 1995, foreign banks could only be engaged in foreign business. After 1995, foreign 
banks were allowed to take part in commercial business under foreign currency. However before 
2001 there were strict rules that limited the entry of foreign banks. For instance only two cities，
Shanghai and Shenzhen, were open to foreign banks. 
2.3 Banking system reform after 1997 
            The third stage of banking system reform was brought by the Asian financial crisis of 
1997. During this period, the importance of a stable financial system stood out. The financial 
crisis brought more freedom to the state-owned banks as they could decide the object of lending. 
However this freedom seemed to bring large non-performing loans to the Big Fours. Berger et al. 
(2009) state that the Big Fours have accumulated a large amount of NPLs during these years. 
Meanwhile the Chinese government helped to reduce NPLs in the balance sheets of the state-
owned banks.  In 1998, Chinese government injected RMB 27 billion into the Big Fours to 
strengthen the banking system. China continued its reform in banking system in order to be 
prepared for the intensified competition after fully open the banking sector by the end of 2006. 
            When China joined the WTO in 2001, most of its financial sector was opened up. After 
China entered WTO, the restrictions on entrance of foreign bank have been removed. From 2006 
there were no location restrictions for foreign banks. The number of foreign banks has grown 
rapidly by 2011 and there are nearly a hundred foreign banks in the Chinese banking system. The 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Citibank National Association, and the 
Standard Chartered Bank are among the top ten biggest foreign banks in China. As a result, 
foreign experience and international standards were introduced into the Chinese banking system, 
which enhanced the efficiency of domestic banks. 
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             As a consequence of years of reform, China’s banking system changed greatly and 
became a more stable system. Major Chinese commercial banks enhanced their ability of 
attracting capital and allocating asset during the past decade. The Big Fours has grown to be top 
thirty banks in the world. Among them the Agricultural Bank of China is listed in the eighth of 
the world’s top one thousand banks and ranked A1 by Moody’s. All of the Big Fours were listed 
on the Shanghai stock exchanges after 2010 and since then foreigners can buy limited number of 
shares of these banks.  
2.4 The continuity of banking system reform 
             By the year of 2009, Chinese banking reform achieved milestone progress. The mono-
bank system translated into a complicated system which consists of the central bank (PBC), 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Banking Association (CBA), three 
policy banks (CDB, TEIBC and ADBC), five partially privatized SOCBs (ICBC, ABC, BOC, 
CCB and BOCOM), 12 Joint-Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs), more than 100 City-
Commercial Banks (CCBs), and a large amount of other small financial institutions. However 
this does not mean the Chinese banking system has become an absolutely stable system. There 
are still many problems to be solved during the restructuring process. For example, the bad debt 
level for state-owned banks is still relatively high, and better manage skills are still needed to 
improve banks’ operating efficiency. 
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3. Literature Review 
         There exist many studies on the performance of banks in different countries. The factors 
that affect the bank performance are different, and many studies suggest that these differences 
depend on the locations where different banks operate; for example, the factors that affect bank 
performance in transition economies would be different from the factors that affect bank 
performance in developed economies. Through the study of existing literature, we notice that the 
factors that affect the bank performance generally include organizational structure, institution 
size, capital, national economy, and management expertise, etc. 
             In the finance and economics literature, ownership structure is often considered as an 
important factor that can affect a financial institution’s performance. Ownership structure for 
financial institutions is often divided into state ownership and private ownership. Shleifer (1998) 
argues that private ownership is often more preferable to public ownership because organizations 
under private ownership have motivations to earn profit, and this can make organizational 
operation more efficient. However, private ownership may not always be the best choice and 
may cause problems in some situations.  Bonin et al (2004) used data from banks in transition 
countries to analyze the impact of ownership on banking performance. They got the conclusion 
that privatization is not directly related to better performance. One study on Mainland China’s 
privatization experience finds that government ownership has a positive impact on partially 
privatized state-owned enterprises (Qian Sun et al., 2002). On the other hand, Verbrugge et al., 
(2000) find that bank privatization improved the performance of banks in OECD countries by 
increasing these banks’ profitability. So far, majority academic studies find that state-controlled 
enterprises do not necessarily deliver expected benefits to the general public. Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1997) find that the activities of state controlled companies are often connected with 
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political objectives of government officials. The practice of state ownership for banks and 
enterprises is common in transition economies and many big financial institutions are controlled 
by governments. Cecchtti and Krause (2001) find that state-owned banks can make a country’s 
monetary policy ineffective. These studies conclude that state ownership sometimes causes 
organizations to ignore social objectives and to implement inefficient operations.  
             There are some recent papers examined the impact of government ownership on the 
banking industry. Banking systems in most countries consist of state-owned banks and privately-
owned banks (POBs). In fact, state-owned banks often control the majority of total assets in the 
national banking system.	  Micco et al. (2007) find that GOBs in developing countries are less 
efficient than POBs in those countries.  Some researchers find that politics has significant impact 
on the banking industry, for example, Brown and Dinc (2005) suggest financial institutions that 
are in economic trouble are more likely to be taken over by the governments before elections. 
Two perspectives are often used to discuss the role of government in a country’s banking system: 
the social perspective and political perspective. Historically many state-controlled banks were set 
up for the purpose of investing in areas that private banks were unwilling support, particularly 
areas that are critical for a country’s development. According to social perspective, government-
owned banks (GOBs) can help to stabilize market and improve social benefits. In addition, social 
perspective concludes that a nation’s banking system with larger weights of GOBs should have 
higher economic growth rate. Political perspective focuses on political rather than social 
objectives, and it argues that GOBs are used by politicians to provide economic advantage to 
their supporters.	  After financial crisis, governments spent huge amount of money on bailouts of 
failed banks in Europe, and this has caused public outcry. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicate, 
GOBs are controlled by the political party that is in power, and politicians often have political 
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agenda that is in conflict with public interests, and this can threaten country’s social interests in 
some cases.  
            Many studies have researched the impact of state control on banks. These studies can 
generally be divided into following two categories: 
(i) Macroeconomic analysis, most of which research the impact of state ownership on 
financial development, stability of economy, and other macroeconomic factors 
(ii) Microeconomic analysis, most of which research the performance of GOBs and 
privately-owned banks (POBs). Some studies research why certain activities are 
conducted by the GOBs 
            By using data of Chinese banks from 1997 to 2004, Lin and Zhang (2009) find that the 
four state-owned commercial banks are less profitable, less efficient and tend to have lower asset 
qualities compare to other types of banks in China except policy banks. Barth et al. (2001) 
suggest countries that have higher degree of government involvement in the banking sector, tend 
to have less developed banking systems and worse economic performance. GOBs may have 
political or social goals to achieve, and these goals may not put organizational performance or 
efficiency as priority.  However, Altunbus et al. (2001) do not find sufficient evidence to indicate 
that privately-owned banks are more efficient than government-owned banks, although POBs 
may have some performance advantages that GOBs do not have. Interestingly, Adrianova et al. 
(2010) also find that countries with higher proportion of state-owned banks have higher 
economic growth rate than countries with lower proportion of state-owned banks, and this 
finding suggests that national banks can contribute to a country’s economic development. 
Overall, either government-owned banks or privately-owned banks can have certain advantages 
over the other. Lower profitability and efficiency for GOBs may be related to the fact that GOBs 
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finance projects with high social returns that POBs are not willing to finance, and in this way 
state-owned banks may contribute some benefits that POBs cannot contribute. 
            Most banks in China are controlled by the state, which means majority banks in the 
country are either controlled by the central government or controlled by governments at the local 
level. The existence of foreign banks in a country’s financial system has certain impact on a 
country’s banking industry. Some recent studies have examined banks’ performance in transition 
economies by using financial measures. According to IMF (2000), foreign banks’ return on 
equity (ROE) is significantly higher than domestic banks’ ROE in Hungary, Poland, and the 
Czech Republic from 1996 to 1998.When foreign banks enter a country’s market, the 
competition is intensified and country’s banking system becomes more diversified. Claessens 
and Huizinga (2001) suggest that foreign bank entry can improve a country’s banking system 
because intensified competition can improve banks’ operating efficiency. Some researchers find 
that the entry of foreign banks has both positive and negative impacts on the domestic banking 
system. It seems that the effects of foreign bank entry, whether they are good or bad, will depend 
on a country’s specific situation, for example, depending on the country’s level of economic 
development and general business environment. 
            The measurement of commercial banking profit is usually divided into internal and 
external parts. The internal measurements are usually generated from banks’ financial statements 
while external measurements are related to operational and outside business environment, which 
influence the managerial and administrative environment of financial industry. Size, capital and 
costs management are often considered as internal measurements by many studies. Akhavein et 
al. (1997) suggest that size is a main variable which is positively correlated with banking 
profitability because relatively large banks can raise capital at lower costs. The amount of loan 
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can also contribute to banking profits. Some scholars believe that there is a positive relationship 
between loan ratio and profitability. Bank profitability is usually measured by Return on Asset 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and in some situations, the net interest margin. Other 
macroeconomic factors such as regulatory changes can also be used to measure bank 
performance. 
 
4. Data, Methodology, and Variable 
4.1 Data 
            In our analysis, we use Bankscope database and Chinese Almanac of Finance to collect 
an unbalanced panel data. We retrieve the ROA, ROE, NPLs (Impaired loans/Gross loans), NIM 
(Net Interest Margin), bank size, and capital ratio for major banks in China through 2000 to 2011. 
The total amount of observations collected from the database is 12,856. As table 1 shows, our 
sample contains data for the Big Fives with 59 observations, three policy banks with 36 
observations, 11 Joint-Stock Commercial Banks with 109 observations, 13 city-level commercial 
banks with 134 observations, and 8 foreign banks with 40 observations. Our sample totally yields 
378 observations. Some of our observations are not used in the regressions because some banks 
lack data for some years during their historical period. 
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Table 1   Distribution of observations (number of banks for each available type) 
Year          State-owned          Policy       Joint-Equity      City-Commercial      Foreign        Total 
 
 
2000                4                         3                  7                             5                        0                   19 
2001                5                         3                  7                             7                        0                    22 
2002                5                         3                  7                            10                       0                    25 
2003                5                         3                  7                            12                       0                    27 
2004                5                         3                  9                            12                       0                    29 
2005                5                         3                  8                            13                       2                    31 
2006                5                         3                 11                           13                       2                    31 
2007                5                         3                 11                           13                       6                    38 
2008                5                         3                 10                           13                       7                    38 
2009                5                         3                 10                           13                       7                    37 
2010                5                         3                 11                           12                       8                    39 
2011                5                         3                 11                           12                       8                    39 
Total              59                        36                109                         134                    40                 375 
            
          The Big Fives contains five state-owned commercial banks, namely Industrial & 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank, Bank of China (CBB), 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and Bank of Communications (BC). They are five biggest 
banks in China. Among which, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China is the biggest bank in 
China. Until the end of 2011, with the asset accounts to 15.476868 trillion, ICBC became the 
third largest bank in the world in terms of total assets. 
            The three policy banks were established in 1994. During the second period of Chinese 
banking reform, the Agricultural Development Bank of China, China Development Bank, and 
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the Export-Import Bank of China were established in order to undertake the duties of 
government spending functions. They are now still completely owned by the government of 
China. 
             Joint-Stock Commercial Banks are smaller than the Big Five state-owned banks and 
three policy banks in terms of total assets, nevertheless have many branches in vast developed 
area in eastern part of China. We choose 11 Joint-Stock Commercial Banks, namely Hua Xia 
Bank, the Ping An Bank, China Minsheng Bank, China Guangfa Bank, Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank, China Everbright Bank, China Zheshang Bank, China Merchants Bank, 
China Bohai Bank, Baoshang Bank and Evergrowing Bank in our analysis because these banks 
have large amount of assets and they are highly representative of situations of Chinese Joint-
Stock Commercial Banks and can provide a broad view of Chinese banking system at the local 
city level. 
            We also collected data on city-level commercial banks as they cover most second-tier and 
third-tier cities in China. These banks are partially owned by governments at the local level and 
other private investors. We selected 13 Joint-Stock Commercial Banks in our investigation. They 
are the Bank of Qingdao, the Bank of Tianjin, the Harbin Bank, the Bank of Changsha, the Bank 
of Shanghai, the bank of Hangzhou, the Bank of Nanchang, the Bank of Jiangsu, the Bank of 
Shaoxing, the Bank of Dalian, the Bank of Nanjing, the Bank of Wenzhou, and the Bank of 
Beijing. Some of these banks were established in recent years and do not have available data 
prior to 2005. These city-level banks are highly representative because they mainly operated in 
major Chinese cities that play important roles in the Chinese economy. 
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             Along with these banks, we also chose data from several foreign banks as they have 
become a growing competing power in the Chinese banking system. We chose the Citibank, 
Bank of Montreal, Bank of East Asia, Deutsche Bank, HSBC Bank, JP Morgan Chase Bank, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, and United Overseas Bank as our sample for foreign banks. 
4.2 Methodology and Variables 
           We follow methodology put forward by Berger et al. (2005).  We estimate the following 
regression model:  
Bank Performance variables = Constant +β1 Static Ownership Indicators + β2* Dynamic 
Ownership Indicators + α* Control Variables + Error Term                                      (1) 
           The Variables are defined in Table 2 in appendix. We separate the variables in our model 
into three categories: Performance variables (dependent variables), control variables 
(independent variables), and ownership structure variables ((explanatory variables). The main 
hypothesis is that the effect of government ownership on performance is negative. 
4.2.1 Performance Measures (Dependent Variables) 
            In our analysis, we use three measurements to evaluate bank performance; they are 
Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Impaired Loans to Gross Loans Ratio. 
Return on Asset is calculated as net income divided by average total assets. The ROA ratio is 
generally used to evaluate a company’s ability to generate profits from its available total assets, 
and it is often used to compare performance of organizations in the similar industry. In most 
cases, higher ROA ratio indicates that a bank has better performance. Return on Equity is 
calculated as net income divided by total average equity. The ROE ratio is used to measure how 
efficiently a bank can generate profits from its shareholder’s equity. ROE is best used to compare 
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companies or organizations in the same or similar industry. Impaired Loans to Gross Loans Ratio 
is calculated as impaired loans divided by gross loans, and it is used to measure a bank’s asset 
quality. The higher Impaired Loans to Gross Loans Ratio, the worse a bank’s asset quality is, and 
bad asset quality often has negative impact on bank performance. 
4.2.2 Independent Variables (Control Variables) 
            Bank size, capital ratio, and net interest margin are included as independent variables in 
our analysis. These three independent variables are used as specific factors to measure bank’s 
profitability, and each of the three independent variables has its own characteristics that could 
affect bank’s profitability measurement. 
Bank Size 
            Bank size is determined by bank’s logarithm of total assets. In general, banks that have 
bigger size (with more assets) tend to have larger business scopes and therefore have more 
business competitive advantages than smaller banks. On the other hand, due to large amount of 
business operations brought by big banks’ larger business scopes, they are more vulnerable to 
systematic market risk; therefore, big banks’ performance are often subject to the performance of 
a country’s economy. According to Shleifer (1998) bank size is positively correlated to the bank 
performance to certain degree, and when bank size passes certain level its impact on bank 
performance will not be as significant as before. 
Capital Ratio 
            Capital ratio is calculated as equity divided by total assets, and it is used to evaluate the 
performance plays an important role to evaluate bank performance. It is a ratio that measures 
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bank’s ability to meet liability and other risks such as credit risk. Capital ratio is usually 
expressed as a percentage when used for financial analysis. Many countries’ banking regulators 
pay close attention to capital ratios in order to protect depositors, and this can help to maintain 
confidence in the banking system. 
Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
            Net Interest Margin is calculated as net interest income divided by average earnings 
assets, and it is usually expressed as a percentage. The higher net interest margin means that a 
bank has greater ability to generate profits. Net Interest Margin is a profitability measure and can 
be used to evaluate a bank’s investing and lending activities. Generally speaking, others things 
being equal, the higher NIM means that greater ability that a bank has to earn profits. Net 
Interest Margin is widely used by analysts across the globe to conduct financial analysis, 
especially for the evaluation of bank profitability, as mentioned by Brown and Dinc (2005). 
4.2.3 Ownership structure variables (Ownership indicators) 
Static ownership indicators (variables) 
           Static ownership indicators are variables that identify the banks that did not experience 
change in their ownership structure during the investigating period. Static ownership indicators 
are identified for each type of banks, and if there is no change for the ownership of a bank, the 
data for related information will not be selected. 
Dynamic ownership indicators (variables) 
          Dynamic ownership indicators are variables that identify the banks that have ownership 
changes after the year of 2005, which is the year that major state-owned banks started public 
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offering. The impact of such ownership change can last up to 3 years. The dynamic ownership is 
applied to measure how the performance of major state-owned banks changes after 2005. For 
those major state-owned banks, the performance after 2005 is compared with the performance 
before 2005 in order to evaluate performance. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
           Table 3 & 4 show the summary statistics of the performance and control related variables. 
For each performance variable and control variable, mean, standard deviation, maximum value 
and minimum value are illustrated for each type of banks. Related values are calculated based on 
available data from 2000 to 2011 for each type of banks. City level banks have the highest 
average ROA of 0.8334 and the maximum value of ROA for this type of bank is 1.73, which is 
quite high compare with other Chinese banks, while foreign banks have the second highest 
average ROA of 0.7447 with maximum value of 1.74. Our results show that foreign banks have 
highest standard deviation of 0.4493, which may suggest that foreign banks in China perform 
quite differently. Policy banks have the lowest average ROA of 0.4269, part of the reason may 
be that policy banks are totally controlled by the Chinese central government and are not profit 
driven, so policy banks do not have incentive to conduct commercial businesses but instead they 
focus on major projects or policy operations that are encouraged by the Chinese government.  
            In terms of ROE, our data shows that city level banks also have the highest average of 
16.3713, while foreign banks have the lowest average ROE with value of 7.6775. Foreign banks’ 
low ROE maybe related to low market penetration rate; that is, compare with local Chinese 
banks, foreign banks have fewer local business branches, and this may limit foreign banks’ 
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performance to certain degree. The big five state-owned banks have average ROE with value of 
12.28, which is quite similar as joint-stock banks. However, state-owned banks’ ROE value also 
has quite high standard deviation, which suggests that these banks’ performance has relatively 
higher fluctuation and is subject to change of government policies. Even though state-owned 
banks have been operating as commercial banks for years, they are still affected by government 
policy significantly. Policy banks have average ROE with value of 9.6997, which is the second 
lowest among all the five bank types. Even though policy banks have been granted a lot of 
resources by the Chinese government, they still have relatively lower ROA and ROE ratios. This 
is consistent with theoretical argument that government ownership has negative impact on bank 
performance in developing countries. 
            In terms of impaired loans/gross loans ratio, big five state-owned banks have the highest 
ratio with value of 8.6505, and this suggests that these banks have highest level of bad debt, 
which often causes operational problems for banks over the long term. Foreign banks have 
lowest level of impaired loans/gross loans ratio with value of 0.6903 and lowest level of standard 
deviation of 1.1279. This suggests that foreign banks in China manage their bad debt quite 
effectively. Policy banks have the second highest level of average impaired loans/gross loans 
ratio with value of 3.518, and this means that policy banks also have relatively high level of bad 
debt. It is not surprising to see that banks with high level of government ownership in China tend 
to have high level of bad debt, and this is because Chinese government often provides help to 
these banks when their bad debt surpasses certain level, and the result is that these banks have 
less incentive to manage their debts because they know that help will be granted from the 
government when they run into trouble. Since impaired loans/gross loans ratio is one important 
factor to evaluate bank performance, our result is consistent with past literature Micco et al. 
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(2007) which suggest that government owned banks in developing countries often have 
inefficient business operations. 
 
 
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics of Performance Variables (measured in percentage %) 
ROA  
       State-owned                         0.7447                     0.4473                          1.47                  0.01 
       Joint-stock                           0.5891                      0.4377                         1.45                  -1.39   
       City                                      0.8334                      0.4085                         1.73                 -0.48 
       Policy                                   0.4269                      0.4635                         1.31                  0.01 
       Foreign                                 0.7773                      0.4493                         1.74                 -0.06 
ROE 
       State-owned                         12.28                        15.7409                      83.46                -27.93                    
       Joint-stock                           12.7236                     23.1267                      42.16               -193.9 
       City                                      16.3713                     7.6440                        37.72               -14.06 
       Policy                                   9.6997                       8.6231                        28.37               0.14 
       Foreign                                 7.6775                       5.4737                        21.91               -0.31 
Impaired loans/Gross loans (NPLs) 
       State-owned                          8.6505                      10.1582                    34.17                 0.08 
       Joint-stock                            3.1017                       5.1913                       28.43                0.1 
       City                                       2.8525                       4.1974                       24.64                0.6 
       Policy                                    3.518                        8.0140                        45.08                0.4 
       Foreign                                  0.6903                      1.1279                         4.1                  0.05 
 
      Performance Variables           Mean             Standard Deviation             Max                  Min 
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Table 4 Summary statistics of control variables 
Net interest margin (NIM) (in percentage %) 
        State-owned                        2.31                           0.72                           3.25                  1.39 
        Joint-stock                          2.2377                      0.8191                         3.52                 1.07 
       City                                     2.3756                      1.0306                         4.73                  1.1 
        Policy                                 1.4426                      0.9662                         3.08                 -0.12 
        Foreign                               1.5373                      1.0487                         3.84                 0.79 
Asset Log  
        State-owned                        6.63                          0.3232                        7.19                 5.80 
        Joint-stock                          5.4442                       0.5520                       6.4274             4.0131 
        City                                    4.7981                        0.4828                       5.9805             3.8882 
       Policy                                 5.9263                        0.4922                       5.4298              3.5631   
       Foreign                               4.5427                        0.5472                      5.4298              3.5631 
Capital ratio 
       State-owned                        0.04                           0.0429                        0.09                 -0.14 
       Joint-stock                          0.0454                        0.0340                       0.3135             -0.0132 
       City                                     0.0531                        0.0208                       0.1307             0.0171 
       Policy                                 0.0435                        0.0284                       0.1207              0.0118 
       Foreign                               0.1302                        0.0656                       0.3227             0.0474 
Note: Actual asset numbers are shown in additional table of appendix 
           
            Table 5 reports the regression results when using ROA, ROA and Impaired loans/Gross 
loans (NPLs) as dependent variables. We conduct regression test for each type of banks on ROA, 
ROE and NPLs. The number of total observations is 381, including 59 observations for the Big 
      Control Variables                Mean               Standard Deviation                Max                Min 
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Five state-owned banks, 113 observations for joint-stock banks, 134 observations for city-level 
commercial banks, 35 observations for policy banks, and 40 observations for foreign banks.  
          Our regression results show that for big five state-owned banks, the impact of change in 
government ownership is positively correlated with bank performance; that is, the change of 
government ownership has improved state-owned banks’ performance to certain degree. The 
positive correlation exists for both ROA and ROE measurements, and it also shows that after 
2005 (the year when major state-owned banks started to go public) performance for major state-
owned banks has improved. This is consistent with the conclusion drawn by Boubakri et al. 
(2004) that privatization can improve the performance of a bank to some extent. The 
performance improvement is statistically significant for ROA measurement since t-stats is 
3.4856 (significantly above 1.96) and p-value is 0.00094 (significantly lower than 0.01); that is, 
both values are statistically significant. However, for ROE and NPLs measurements, although 
the change of government ownership does have impact on bank performance, the statistic value 
is not as significant as ROA measurement. This may be attributed to the fact that state-owned 
banks in China rely heavily on fixed assets to generate income, so the value of ROA measure is 
more obvious and significant. 
            Regarding the joint-stock banks, regression results show that the decreasing in 
government involvement and slight increase in non-government ownership (such as private 
ownership and foreign ownership) can improve banks performance slightly. After such 
ownership change, joint-stock banks’ bad debt level (NPLs) has decreased while both ROA and 
ROE have increased, and this suggests that these banks’ performance has improved. Lower 
NPLs generally means that there is improvement in a bank’s asset management, which is one of 
the important factors for evaluating bank performance. On the other hand, it should be noted that 
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regression values does not show that the impact of such ownership change is significantly 
correlated with improvement of bank performance, and this means that other factors might also 
have contributed to the improvement of bank performance. 
            Regarding the city level banks, our regression results show that there is positive 
correlation between ownership change and bank performance. In terms of ROA performance 
measurement, the positive correlation exists for both periods that before 2005 and after 2005, and 
this suggests that for city level banks, the increase of private ownership and foreign ownership 
might contribute to the higher ROA ratio. However, regression results do not indicate that the 
correlation is statistically significant since neither t-stats nor p-value has met the significance 
criteria. This means that other factors may also contribute to the performance improvement for 
city level banks during the research period. 
           The three policy banks have experienced no change in ownership during the selected 
period since they are completely owned by the Chinese government. Comparing to the other four 
categories of banks in our analysis, we found that three policy banks may be the least profitable 
banks in China. This may result from the fact that policy banks in China are created to take over 
the state spending functions of the country. They are response for financing economic and trade 
development and state-invested projects. The inherent functions of these policy banks have 
determined that they have to put the benefits of the country in front of their own profits. These 
banks may have to invest in projects that are significant for country’s economic development 
over the long term but provide fewer profits over the short term. Bonin et al. (2005) get the 
similar result that government-owned banks tend to collect fewer deposits and have higher costs 
when providing services that have social benefits.  
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             Foreign banks in China do not have ownership from Chinese government, so the 
ownership impact is minimal; however, these banks are subject to local regulations and banking 
laws. After China jointed WTO and opened its banking market, the entrance of foreign banks has 
intensified competition among banks, and this helps to improve the overall banking system in 
China. Although most foreign banks in China do not have long operating history, these foreign 
banks have brought mature banking management skills and experience to the country. 
Table 5 Performance and ownership change (regression results) 
Static indicators 
          State-owned              -0.1172                     0.2930                            3.2142 
          (p-value)                   (0.3525)                    (0.9644)                         (0.3417) 
          Joint-stock                 0.0068                      0.2874                            1.230 
           (p-value)                   (0.9597)                   (0.9709)                          (0.4792) 
           City                            0.0525                     3.1354                            1.1869 
           (p-value)                    (0.7885)                  (0.4920)                          (0.6909) 
           Policy                         0.0183                     -2.7290                           1.3747 
           (p-value)                    (0.9358)                  (0.6699)                          (0.8357) 
           Foreign                       0.0155                     1.0452                            -0.1277 
           (p-value)                    (0.3024)                   (0.6007)                          (0.7890) 
Dynamic indicators 
            State-owned                0.5434                     5.5393                          -6.2764 
            (p-value)                    (0.0010)***             (0.4997)                        (0.1392) 
            Joint-stock                  -0.0131                     7.7718                           -2.2668 
            (p-value)                    (0.9231)                    (0.3316)                        (0.2001)   
            City                             0.8520                     -2.1175                           -2.1651 
                                             ROA                       ROE              Impaired loans/Gross loans (NPLs) 
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            (p-value)                    0.0322**                   (0.5991)                        (0.4119) 
             Policy                         0.0111                     3.7909                           -3.2411 
             (p-value)                    (0.9502)                   (0.4493)                        (0.5322) 
             Foreign                      -0.2899                     -1.4801                         0.2288 
             (p-value)                    (0.3024)                   (0.5838)                        (0.7230) 
Number of observations          381                             381                              381 
Note: Significance level *10%; **5%，***1% 
 
            Table 5 reports the regression results for performance and control variables. For each 
control variable, bank size, net interest margin, and capital ratio, five bank types are also 
identified respectively. Regarding the bank size, our results show that for state-owned banks, the 
impact of bank size on ROA and NPLs is positive. For joint-stock banks and policy banks, we 
also see positive correlation between bank size and ROA. For city level banks, the regression 
results show that the impact of bank size is positive on ROA, ROE and NPLs all three 
performance variables. This suggests that large banks can gain business advantage because it has 
more business assets that can be put into business operations. This result is consistent with 
Hauner (2005), which suggests that large banks can benefit from economic scales through the 
allocation of fixed assets.  
           Regarding net interest margin, our regression results show that for state-owned banks,  the 
net interest margin is positively correlated with ROA and ROE, and the t-stats for ROA 
measurement is significant, which means that net interest margin has positive impact on bank 
performance. Generally speaking, higher net interest margin means that banks have higher ability 
to earn profitability. We also noticed that for net interest margin is negatively correlated with 
ROA and ROE for policy banks, although the values are not statistically significant, the results 
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do have consistency with the fact that policy banks in China are not profit driven and do not take 
deposits from the general public. For foreign banks, net interest margin is positively correlated 
with ROA, ROE and NPLs, and this result shows that net interest margin is an important 
measure for evaluate foreign banks’ profitability. This result is consistent with the fact that 
foreign banks are more mature and have superior management skills. 
 
Table 5 Performance and control variables (regression results)   
Control variables 
Net interest margin     
              State-owned           0.1993                      2.4637                                -5.6486 
              Joint-stock              0.1831                     4.5285                                 0.2007 
               City                        0.1695                     3.5867                               -0.6543 
               Policy                    -0.02322                  -2.0167                               0.9631  
               Foreign                   0.1433                     1.0510                                0.1268 
Bank size (asset log) 
               State-owned            0.1488                    -7.4183                               0.1851 
               Joint-stock              0.1463                   -3.6150                               -0.5329 
               City                         0.2159                    4.3117                                0.0024 
               Policy                     0.4297                    12.5102                              -1.1735 
               Foreign                   -0.0361                    1.8884                               -1.2303 
Capital ratio 
               State-owned            0.7813                    122.9629                            -91.1445 
               Joint-stock              -1.4796                    32.3976                             -38.2331 
               City                          5.9622                    -141.805                            -6.5440 
                                             ROA                        ROE              Impaired loans/Gross loans (NPLs) 
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               Policy                       9.5644                    -44.8658                            -48.3988 
               Foreign                   -0.4651                    -40.5152                             -3.4223 
 
           
           Regarding capital ratio, we find that for all types of banks, capital ratio is negatively 
correlated with NPLs. This result is not surprising since higher capital ratio generally means 
better banking performance, while higher NPLs generally mean worse banking performance. 
Foreign banks in China have higher average capital ratio than local Chinese banks, and higher 
capital level generally implies that less fund can be lent out or be used for investment. Higher 
capital ratio for foreign banks may be attributed to the fact that foreign banks in China need to 
hold more capital to safeguard daily business operations, while local Chinese banks have more 
resources to gain capital and can get more assistance from the governments at the central level 
and local level. 
           The regression results for the overall bank data from 2000 to 2011 shows that foreign 
banks tend to have lower bad debt level and generally better performance in terms of ROA. This 
result may due to the fact that foreign banks generally have more mature banking experience and 
better management skills, and this also explains why performance for Chinese state-owned banks 
has improved after some foreign ownership has been introduced. 
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6. Conclusion 
Chinese banking system has experienced dramatic transformation during the past two decades. In 
this paper we analyze the impact of government ownership on bank performance by using 
unbalanced panel data for major Chinese banks from 2000 to 2011. Regression and related 
analysis are conducted for all five types of banks, and performance measures (dependent 
variables) for all the banks are evaluated based on Impaired loans/Gross loans (NPLs), ROA and 
ROE three factors. Independent variables consist of bank size, capital ratio and net interest 
margin three measurements. Static indicators and dynamic indicators are used to evaluate related 
ownership change and are included in the regression analysis. To compare bank performances 
before and after the reform in ownership structure, we use dynamic indicators to analyze 
performance changes before and after mergers and acquisitions and we use static indicators to 
compare the differences between banks that undergo change in ownership structure and banks 
that did not have changes in ownership structure during the selected period. 
          Our empirical results show that after decrease in government ownership for major Chinese 
banks, especially big five state-owned banks and city level banks, related banking performance 
has improved. After 2005 state-owned banks started to go public, that is, these banks open doors 
for investment from outside investors (government still owns majority of state-owned banks) and 
small percentage of foreign ownership is allowed. Our data show that virtually all the state-
owned banks have seen significant improvement in ROA and ROE ratios after they went public, 
and regression results show that there is positive correlation between government ownership 
change and performance of state-owned banks. Although some of the performance measures are 
not statistically significant, the general trend for performance improvement is quite clear. The 
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results are consistent with Claessens and Huizinga (2001) that foreign bank entry can improve 
banks’ operating efficiency and performance.  
           Regarding joint-stock and city level banks, although the performance of these banks has 
also improved after government ownership change, our data does not show that the correlation 
between ownership change and performance improvement is statistically significant. This could 
suggest that other factors such as improved management skills and application of more advanced 
technology may contribute to the improved banking performance; however, these factors are 
beyond the scope of this research paper.  
           The three policy banks have poorer performance than their counterparts since they have 
the lowest average ROA and second lowest average ROE. Past literature about Chinese banks 
suggests that policy banks in China may be more efficient and have less non-performing loans 
than other commercial banks because these policy banks can get capital injection by the 
government and have access to policy support. It is interesting to find that policy banks have 
second highest NPLs in our data (the banks with highest NPLs are state-owned banks). We think 
this may result from the fact that in China banks with large amount of government ownership 
tend to care less about non-performing loans because these banks expect the government to take 
care of bad assets and bad loans. Another reason could be due to the fact that policy banks have 
different goals and they focus more on risky projects that are risky but with important for 
country’s economic development. 
           Overall, our findings suggest that major banks in China tend to perform better when the 
government ownership on these banks decreases and when foreign ownership for these banks is 
introduced. This is consistent with results from many related literature about the relationship 
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between government ownership and banks. However, there are still some insufficiencies that 
should be noticed; for example, determinants of banking performance may be different in normal 
periods and financial crisis (2008-2009), and our data covers these time periods. In the future, it 
might be a good idea for related research studies to evaluate the impact of financial crisis on 
Chinese bank performance. 
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                                                               APPENDIX 
Table 2 (Definition for related variables) 
(Variables) Symbol                                                       Definition                                                     
effeeffeffEffects 
Dependent Variables 
       Performance measures                       Return on Asset = Net income/Average total assets 
                                                                  Return on Equity = Net income/Average total equity 
                                                     Impaired loans to gross loans ratio= Impaired loans/Gross loans  
                                                                 (This ratio is used to measure asset quality) 
Independent Variables 
        Bank Size (Asset)                                 Logarithm of total asset is used to measure bank size.                                           
                Asset_State                                   Logarithm of total assets for state-owned banks 
                Asset_Policy                                 Logarithm of total assets for policy banks 
                Asset_Joint Equity                        Logarithm of total assets for joint equity banks 
                Asset_City                                     Logarithm of total assets for city commercial banks 
                Asset_Foreign                                Logarithm of total assets for foreign banks 
      Capital Ratio                                              Capital Ratio = Equity/Total Assets 
               Capital Ratio_State                           Capital Ratio for state-owned banks 
               Capital Ratio_Policy                         Capital Ratio for policy banks 
               Capital Ratio_Joint Equity                Capital Ratio for joint equity banks 
               Capital Ratio_City                             Capital Ratio for city commercial banks 
               Capital Ratio_Foreign                       Capital Ratio for foreign banks 
          Net Interest Margin                          NIM = Net interest income/Average earning assets 
                 NIM_State                                       NIM for state-owned banks 
                 NIM_Policy                                     NIM for policy banks 
                 NIM_Joint Equity                            NIM for joint equity banks 
                 NIM_City                                         NIM for city banks 
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                 NIM_Foreign                                    NIM for foreign banks  
Ownership structure variables 
         Static (variables) indicators 
                  Static_State                                      Static variables for state banks 
                  Static_Policy                                    Static variables for policy banks 
                  Static_Joint Equity                           Static variables for joint equity banks 
                  Static_City                                        Static variables for city banks 
                  Static_Foreign                                  Static variables for foreign banks 
        Dynamic (variables) indicators 
                   Dynamic_State                                 Dynamic variables for state banks 
                   Dynamic_Policy                               Dynamic variables for policy banks 
                   Dynamic_Joint Equity                      Dynamic variables for joint equity banks 
                   Dynamic_City                                   Dynamic variables for city banks 
                   Dynamic_Foreign                             Dynamic variables for foreign banks 
       Additional dummies used for regression 
                   Dummy_Policy 
                   Dummy_Joint Equity 
                   Dummy_City 
                   Dummy_Foreign 
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Additional Table (Bank actual assets measured in billions of U.S.) 
             Bank Type                            Mean                         Max                          Min                                                                                               
Actual Asset 
           State-owned                       903.8740                   2,579.478                104.697 
             Joint-Stock                           89.6618                     445.952                   1.7178 
             City                                      19.8107                      159.332                  1.2885 
             Policy                                 237.4254                    1,041.918               11.3768 
             Foreign                               11.1776                        44.8358                   0.6095 
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